The reconstruction of bombed cities in Japan after the Second World War

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Abstract. The reconstruction of bombed cities in Japan after the Second World War has recently attracted much attention and has given rise to important research in English on exceptional cases, such as Tokyo, Osaka and Hiroshima. This research shows that these cities were forced to retreat from the initial idealistic planning for reconstruction owing to pressure from central government, and that local authorities were not able to incorporate the views of ordinary people under the town planning system at that time. This paper examines the cases of eight provincial cities that were designated by the government in the late 1940s as ‘model cities’ of war-damage reconstruction, as they were considered to have made remarkable progress. The planned major reconstruction of the eight cities, which brought about substantial changes to their physical forms, was in most cases characterized by a wide street leading to a new square fronting the principal railway station. However, the reaction of ordinary citizens to the official reconstruction proposals often prevented their full implementation.

Key Words: Second World War, post-war reconstruction, civil involvement, Japan, urban planning

Previous studies of urban reconstruction have demonstrated the difficulties encountered in implementing the original visions of the reconstruction plans. Reddaway (1951) showed this in his study of the City of London after the Great Fire of 1666, as did Sutcliffe (1970) in his study of the rejuvenation of central Paris envisaged by Hausmann in the nineteenth century. Urban reconstruction has often been a direct response to disasters, especially human-induced calamities, as in the Great Fire of 1666. Recently, the reconstruction of bombed cities in Europe in the twentieth century, particularly those in Germany and England, has attracted much attention and given rise to a great deal of research (Diefendorf, 1990, 1993; Hasegawa, 1992; Larkham and Lilley, 2001; Tiratsoo, 1990).

In the rising tide of interest in reconstruction following disaster or catastrophe (Burby, 2001; Diefendorf, 2003; Gilliland, 2003; Hasegawa, 2001; Larkham, 2003; Nasr, 2003; Ockman, 2002; Petz, 2001), two important works have appeared in English on the reconstruction of bomb-damaged cities in Japan after the Second World War (Hein et al., 2003; Tiratsoo et al., 2002). Six case studies covered by these works include four ‘exceptional’ cases and two more-ordinary ones. The former are those of the two largest cities in the country (Tokyo and Osaka) and two places symbolic of war tragedies (Hiroshima, the first target of atomic bombing, and Okinawa, a battlefield of ground fighting, which was occupied by the United States from 1945 until 1972). The latter are studies of
Table 1. Populations of the eight model cities in 1940, 1946, and 1955

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1946</th>
<th>1955</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sendai</td>
<td>223,630</td>
<td>225,036</td>
<td>375,844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiba</td>
<td>91,216</td>
<td>105,398</td>
<td>197,956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiratsuka</td>
<td>43,148</td>
<td>41,035</td>
<td>67,022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okazaki</td>
<td>84,073</td>
<td>77,546</td>
<td>155,902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toyohashi</td>
<td>142,716</td>
<td>115,226</td>
<td>202,985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wakayama</td>
<td>170,642</td>
<td>152,901</td>
<td>219,901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukuyama</td>
<td>56,653</td>
<td>57,420</td>
<td>76,484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oita</td>
<td>76,985</td>
<td>82,420</td>
<td>112,429</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Kensetsusho, 1957, p. 295; 1958, pp. 95, 601; 1959b, p. 13; 1960a, pp. 197, 303-4, 606-7; 1960b, p. 437.

provincial cities in the central parts of Japan (Nagaoka and Maebashi). The six cities were forced to retreat, to varying extent, from the initial idealistic planning for reconstruction and, under an urban planning system characterized by the concentration of power in the hands of central government, there was little room for local authorities to incorporate the opinions of ordinary people in their plans. However, considering that no less than 115 cities in Japan were officially designated by the government as war-damaged cities after the war (Kensetsusho, 1959a, p.25), it would appear that there has been a bias towards ‘the exceptions to the reconstruction story’, and that there is a shortage of research into ‘examples of characteristic post-war reconstruction’ (Nasr, 2005, pp. 56-7).

This article seeks to rectify this deficiency by exploring the cases of eight Japanese provincial cities that were designated as ‘model cities’ of war-damage reconstruction by the Ministry of Construction in the late 1940s because progress in their reconstruction had been fairly swift (Tokaishinbunsha, 1954, pp. 177-8). The cities are Sendai, the capital of Miyagi Prefecture in Tohoku region, in the northern part of mainland Japan; Chiba, the capital of Chiba Prefecture, east of Tokyo; Hiratsuka, a city in Kanagawa Prefecture, south of Tokyo; Toyohashi and Okazaki, cities in Aichi Prefecture, in the central part of mainland Japan; Wakayama, the capital of Wakayama Prefecture in the Kansai region, in the western part of mainland Japan; Fukuyama, a city in Hiroshima Prefecture in the south-western part of mainland Japan; and Oita, the capital of Oita Prefecture in Kyushu Island in southern Japan (Table 1).

In exploring these cases, two points are particularly borne in mind: first, the nature of change in urban form and structure envisaged and brought about by war-damage reconstruction; and secondly, the politics of reconstruction. The first point relates to such questions as how it was planned to change the urban form and structure of these bombed cities, how they were actually changed, and how much the reconstruction reflected ‘the zeitgeist of planning and design’ (Larkham, 2003, p. 110).

Land readjustment has been a principal method of Japanese urban planning, on which the war-damage reconstruction was based. It consists of regrouping and re-dividing the land to create or widen roads and open spaces by using parts of individually owned plots. Generally, more emphasis was placed on widening and realigning streets than on creating new ones (Hein et al., 2003, p. 251; Tiratsoo et al., 2002, pp. 52-3). The extent of the widening of existing streets in the bombed cities was unprecedentedly large. Land readjustment was also instrumental in realizing spacious station squares. An interesting question concerns the extent to which war-damage reconstruction was augmentative, namely redevelopment involving the creation...
of new streets, and the extent to which it was adaptive redevelopment, namely redevelopment of a block of land within the framework of existing streets (Conzen, 1981a, pp. 46, 48; Conzen, 1981b, p.110).

With regard to the politics of reconstruction, the aim of this article is to add to knowledge about ‘the complex obstacles that obstruct the implementation of ideal plans and construction of grand buildings’ (Diefendorf, 2003, p. 106) and about the ‘voice’ of ‘actors’ involved in Japanese post-war reconstruction, namely ‘the mass of agents who intervened and readjusted the direction that the rebuilding of the urban fabric took’ (Nasr, 2005, p. 55). These agents include not only planners but also the public, whose actions were often detrimental to the implementation of the ‘dreams’ of the original reconstruction plans (Nasr, 2005, pp. 55-6). Consideration of the voices of the public should then lead to critical examination of Japan’s planning culture. The concept of planning culture is promoted by André Sorensen in his general account of Japanese urban planning and development (Sorensen, 2002) and by Yorifusa Ishida, a distinguished Japanese planning historian. Ishida stresses the importance of such factors as political climate, the state of the economy, national traits, and public opinion in moulding planning policy and practice. In short, planning should constitute a fundamental part of society: therefore, planning and society should interact (Ishida, 2004, pp. 10, 306).

Changes in urban form: streets and station squares

Reconstruction planning envisaged great changes to the urban form of the eight cities. Much wider streets, and more open spaces, were to be provided. For instance, the width of Kosei Dori, the main shopping street of the central area of Okazaki, was to be widened from 15 m to 40 m (Tokaishinbunsha, 1954, p. 145); while that of the north-south axis of Sendai was planned to be increased from a mere 8 m to 50 m, though the widest of the existing roads in the city was only 22 m. This seems to have sparked the rumour that the planned thoroughfare would be used for an airfield for the occupation troops (Sendai-shikaihatsukyoku, 1980, pp. 30-1, 56). The substantial widening of the station street of Toyohashi is evident from comparison of Figures 1 and 2.

Perhaps the most striking case was that of Fukuyama, a city with a population of less than 60 000. Its original reconstruction plan, officially approved by the government in the autumn of 1946, proposed a series of parks (numbered 2 to 8 in Figure 3) as part of a 50 m wide green ring separating the south-eastern industrial area from the central area and intended as both an aesthetic improvement and a fire prevention measure. In addition, a park was proposed on the site of the former castle (number 1 in Figure 3), just north of the principal railway station. There was a further proposal for a 50 m wide thoroughfare starting from the principal national railway station, part of which would be 100 m wide, with a station square of 10 000 m² (Fukuyama Sensaifukkoshi Hensaniinkai, 1975, pp. 32-5).

Station squares were a feature of the reconstruction plans in most cases. For instance, in pre-war Hiratsuka, there was no public open space in front of the principal station other than an 8 m wide road. The reconstruction proposed two squares: to the north one of 15 800 m² and to the south one of 8700 m² (Kanagawaken, 1967, p. 130). In Toyohashi, a station square of 10 000 m² was proposed as a starting point for the 50 m wide thoroughfare in Figure 2. There was a plan for a 6600 m² station square that had been drawn up in 1928, but that plan had not been implemented (Toyohashishi Sensaifukkoshi Hensaniinkai, 1958, pp. 45, 121). The city authority and the National Railway Corporation (NRC) had also collaborated to prepare a plan for the new station building, which opened in 1950 (Fukuoka, 1950, pp.346-9). In Chiba, the city and the prefecture authorities, the NRC and the Keisei private railway company, had ambitious proposals for new stations to replace the existing ones, which were to be implemented.
The reconstruction of bombed cities in Japan

Figure 1. Station street, Toyohashi, before widening of the street. Note the illegal markets on both sides of the street. Reproduced from Toyohashishi Sensaifukkoshi Hensaniinkai (1958), with the permission of the Town Planning Department, City of Toyohashi.

Figure 2. Station street, Toyohashi, after widening of the street. The illegal markets have been replaced by vegetation. Reproduced from Toyohashishi Sensaifukkoshi Hensaniinkai (1958), with the permission of the Town Planning Department, City of Toyohashi.
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Changes in urban form: commercial cores

In a few cases, the centre of gravity of commercial activities was changed through reconstruction. In Toyohashi, the long-established pre-war shopping centre was a district around two streets, Fudakidori and Honmachidori, a stage along the former Tokaido trunk route connecting Edo (renamed Tokyo from the late-nineteenth century) and Kyoto. After the war, the status of the main shopping centre was taken over by a district around Ekiodori and Hirokojidori, streets near the principal railway station. Most people in Japan had to obtain food on their own after the war, usually by bringing black-market goods by train, a fact that made areas near railway stations a focus of commercial activities. Moreover, in Toyohashi projects of land readjustment for war-damage reconstruction were initially commenced in the area around the station (Toyohashishi Sensaifukkoshi Hensaniinkai, 1958, pp. 385-7).

In Chiba, reconstruction planning triggered the change in the location of shopping centres...
by widening Honmachidori, a busy pre-war shopping street, and changing its main function to that of catering for through traffic. The replacement of main railway stations also brought about the replacement of shopping centres connected to these stations (Chibashishi Hensaninkai, 1974, pp. 10, 204-7). In Okazaki, the position of principal shopping centre, long held by Renjaku along the former Tokaido trunk route, was taken over by Kosei after the war. The key factor prompting this change was the difference in attitude among local traders towards war-damage reconstruction. Traders in Renjaku ran long-established shops and were rather inflexible with regard to change. In contrast traders in Kosei were said to be full of enterprising spirit and in favour of reconstruction: for example, they funded widening of the street, in spite of opposition raised by a substantial minority, paving it and, on the suggestion of a leading town planner, Hideaki Ishikawa, making it arcaded (Tokaishinbunsha, 1954, pp. 157-9, 874-5, 878-80).

It should be also noted that in Okazaki, while the actual reconstruction proceeded swiftly, its mayor and traders lamented in 1952 that the rapid progress had been made at the cost of quality. As they pointed out, the widening of Kosei Dori, which was increased to a width of only 20 m, not 40 m as initially considered, was far from being sufficient, and the rebuilt buildings tended to be shoddy and tawdry. The exact reason for the change in road width has yet to be discovered, but the comments of the mayor and others suggest that traders were in such haste in rebuilding that they did not conform to the official proposals (Tokaishinbunsha, 1954, pp. 186-8).

**Changes in urban form: the relocation of graveyards**

The relocation of graveyards associated with temples in the central area was yet another feature of war-damage reconstruction. In Oita, an area of 89 100 m² in the suburbs of the city was designated as a park, one-eighth of which was to be a new graveyard accommodating the existing graves scattered over 6600 m² of land belonging to six temples in the central area (Kensetsusho, 1958, pp. 609, 619-20). In Okazaki, it was also decided to construct a cemetery of 127 700 m², but eventually the proposal was abandoned (Tokaishinbunsha, 1954, pp. 110, 116). In Toyohashi, a cemetery was constructed on the former military training ground, but most of the graves remained on the existing sites ‘due to a lack of understanding and co-operation on the part of the temples concerned’ (Kensetsusho, 1957, pp. 105-6). Most of the temples argued that it would cause undue inconvenience both to them and to their worshippers if the main building of the temple was separated from the graveyard. Therefore, they preferred to keep their graveyards on existing sites, even if that meant losing a proportion of them to land readjustment projects (Toyohashishi Sensai-fukkoshi Hensaninkai, 1958, pp. 115-16). Similarly, the temples in Fukuyama rejected the city authority’s proposal to construct a cemetery and the proposal was not implemented. In the end, the city had to construct two cemeteries; one for graves that could not be accommodated on the existing sites as a result of the land readjustment project, and the other to segregate graves of those who had no surviving relatives. The latter was, however, soon regarded as unsuitable since the surrounding previously undeveloped area rapidly became developed, and had to be replaced in the late 1960s by expansion of the existing cemetery (Fukuyama Sensai-fukkoshi Hensaninkai, 1975, pp. 36, 38-40).

A unique attempt to deal with the problem of burials was made in Wakayama. The city authority could not find a suitable site for a cemetery; in fact it doubted the wisdom of building one. It had constructed one some 30 years before the end of the war in the then outer suburbs, but owing to urban growth this was now well within the urban area. The city thus sought another solution and decided to build a cinerarium, a place to store cinerary urns, annexed to the main building of each temple. This would save land, and the city authority allowed the temples to dispose of the former graveyards in order to attract their
support for the proposal. However, opposition among the temples’ worshippers was so strong that, while twelve temples did build new cineraria, 24 moved to new graveyards (Kensetsusho, 1960a, pp. 635-8; Michiura and Myoraku, 1954, pp. 19-24).

The repercussions of economic constraints, unauthorized buildings, and land requisition

Though the proposals in the reconstruction plans brought about substantial changes in urban form and structure, the achievements often fell short of what was planned, as is suggested through the examples of graveyard relocation. Of particular importance was the stringent financial situation that compelled the government to revive its economic policy, including its policy for war-damage reconstruction in 1949, which required that war-damaged cities drastically reduce their reconstruction proposals. Many local authorities were forced to scale down the land readjustment projects that formed the basis for reconstruction. Consequently, it often became necessary to reduce road widths and the scope for provision of open spaces, including the station squares (Kensetsusho, 1959a, pp. 170-88). Model cities, supposedly well advanced in reconstruction, were no exception. In Hiratsuka, the proposed two squares associated with its principal railway station – the north one of 15 800 m² and the south one of 8700 m² – were reduced to 9140 and 4540 m² respectively (Kanagawaken, 1967, pp. 83, 130). In Oita, the area of land readjustment was not reduced, but its proposed station square was reduced from 16 000 to 12 500 m² (Kensetsusho, 1958, p. 610).

The NRC, in collaborating with the local authorities, was at first eager to rebuild war-damaged main station buildings in a magnificent manner with spacious station squares. It too, however, soon found it necessary to economize. Thus the implementation of reconstruction proposals in connection with the railway stations in Chiba and Fukuyama was much delayed (Fukuyama Sensaifukkoshi Hensaniinkai, 1975, pp. 45-52; Kensetsusho, 1960a, pp. 224-5). Although the main station building of Toyohashi was rebuilt as early as 1950, proposals to provide such facilities as a station hotel and a waiting room were dropped and the width of the station concourse was reduced from 50 m to 35 m, because the NRC could not afford to implement the original proposals (Fukuoka, 1950, p. 349). In Sendai, the reconstruction plan officially approved by the government’s War-Damage Rehabilitation Board in November 1946 envisaged a station square enlarged from the existing size of 3465 m² to some 38 300 m². This would have required the existing station building to be moved by 160 m. The NRC, however, was not keen on the proposed project for financial reasons and, after lengthy prevarications, it was agreed in 1961 by the city and prefecture authorities, the NRC headquarters, Sendai administrative bureau of the NRC, and the Ministry of Construction that the station square should be 17 800 m², so that the new station building would be a mere 9 m from the position of the previous station (Sendai shikaihatsukyoku, 1980, pp. 300-4; 1981, p. 74).

In addition to these difficulties, there were specific factors detrimental to the realization of the original reconstruction proposals. None of the cities discussed in this article were immune from the problems of the mushrooming of unauthorized temporary houses, stalls, or black markets on the sites scheduled for roads, parks, or station squares. This was very different from the situation in bombed cities in Britain, where there were few unauthorized buildings in damaged areas even though there was fierce opposition to the reconstruction proposals of the local authorities (Hasegawa, 1992).

Some bombed cities in Japan also suffered from the requisition of land imposed by the occupation forces. In Wakayama, for example, an occupation force 100 000 strong requisitioned an area of some 2 km² in the central area. As was recollected by one of the inhabitants elected to a committee for a land readjustment project, reconstruction of the city was in a state of anarchy for 3 years or so after
the war, a period during which people could set up unauthorized buildings virtually without constraint, a situation with which the local authorities had no choice but to comply on humanitarian grounds. However, as another former member of a land readjustment project committee recalled, he was prevented from constructing a temporary hut, for the area was to be used for storage by the occupation forces. This worsened the situation in other places, such as areas around the railway stations, as ousted people rushed in to occupy places illegally, and it was not until the end of the 1950s that they were compulsorily evicted (Osakasitoshiseibikyokai, 1992, pp. 223, 233, 256-7).

Civil involvement

Recollections of the citizens of Wakayama also reveal that the citizens harboured ill-feelings towards war-damage reconstruction, especially land readjustment projects. For instance, another former member of a land readjustment project committee observed that rumours were circulating that he had abused his position for personal gain (Osakasitoshiseibikyokai, 1992, p. 230). It is perhaps unjustified to suspect that members of a land readjustment project committee benefited financially. They were not experts on reconstruction: representing landlords and tenants, they mostly did their best in deciding on a plan prepared by the officials for substitute plots for those affected by land readjustment projects. Nevertheless, such suspicion sometimes led to an explosion of rage among citizens, which developed into organized opposition to official reconstruction. In Hiratsuka, a provisional plan laying out substitute lots for one specific area of war-damage reconstruction land readjustment was announced unofficially in May 1947. The area covered the main centre of the city and involved more than 2100 persons who had interests there as landlords or tenants. The laying out of substitute plots would mean for some the loss of part of the land they owned or leased: it might even mean moving to a new place for many people. Understandably, the announcement of substitute plots caused indignation among those affected, and some 300 citizens of the area demonstrated their opposition. They held a protest meeting in the following month, demanding first a ‘complete retraction’ of the existing plan and the preparation of a replacement, and secondly, the ‘resignation en bloc’ of the land readjustment project committee for the area in question. They pointed to ‘undue unfairness and irrationality’ in the plan for substitute plots and argued that this was caused by the ‘reckless act’ of the members of the committee in question in order to ‘look after the interests of their own and their acquaintances’ (Kanagawaken, 1967, pp. 164-5). While the committee was not dissolved, it had to comply with the demands of the citizens to a certain extent. After intensive negotiation, a new plan for substitute plots was published in January 1948 in which areas of leased land less than 33 m² were exempt from being subject to land readjustment. The consequent shortage of 31 300 m² would be compensated for by further reduction of the land of those who owned more than 1000 m², as part of land readjustment (Kanagawaken, 1967, pp. 165-74).

In Fukuyama, the city authority made public its original reconstruction plan at the end of 1945 and held a series of meetings to explain the plan to its citizens. It was sanctioned by the government in 1946 despite the turmoil created by the citizens’ opposition movement. Since many citizens had, despite the difficulties, just managed to build a house to live in, they ‘would understandably oppose any idea forcing them to pull down their hard-earned houses or to give up even part of their land’, every part of which had been put into much needed cultivation (Fukuyama Sensai-fukkoshi Hensaniinkai, 1975, p. 22). More-over, as the levelling of land was the initial step of reconstruction, vegetables raised with care were often trampled on, causing anger among inhabitants at a time when food was scarce. Crucially, the presidents of the neighbourhood associations, usually responsible for implementing measures taken by the local
authorities, formed a caucus of opposition against the reconstruction plan. The result of the election of the land readjustment project committee in January 1947 was that 23 out of 30 members elected were against the existing plan. In April, the mayoral election was won by a candidate who opposed the plan. Inevitably it had to be revised, with the width of the thoroughfare from the station being reduced from 50 m to 36 m (the widest part being reduced from 100 m to 55 m). Little of the proposed ring of parks was completed (Figure 4), a number of smaller parks were scattered more widely, although the park just north of the NRC station was actually increased in size (see also Table 2) (Fukuyama Sensaifukkoshki Hensaniinkai, 1975, pp. 24-5).

In fact, as is shown in Figures 5 and 6, many substantial changes to the street system were implemented, including both the widening of existing streets and the construction of entirely new ones.

In 1950, Toyohashi City Council contemplated establishing an entertainment area on a bombed former school site. Rumours were rife that the area would be filled with ‘special bars’, which meant in effect brothels. The leader of the association of the bar owners actually announced the resolve of its members to move into the area. The local inhabitants

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**Figure 4.** Fukuyama: parks actually completed (shown in black). Reproduced from Fukuyama Sensaifukkoshki Hensaniinkai (1975) p. 169, with the permission of the Town Planning Department, City of Fukuyama.
Table 2. Width of station street and area of station square

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Width of station street (metres)</th>
<th>Area of station square (square metres)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sendai</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>38 350 (later reduced to 17 800)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiba</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>19 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiratsuka</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>15 800 (later reduced to 9 140)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toyohashi</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>10 000 (later increased to 18 600)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wakayama</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>8 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukuyama</td>
<td>100 (later reduced to 55)</td>
<td>10 000 (later increased to 12 940)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oita</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>16 000 (later reduced to 12 500)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


 held a protest meeting and submitted a petition to the City Council with tens of thousands of signatures. Consequently, the association gave up the idea and the area was redeveloped for other uses, such as a civic centre, consisting of the court and the district public prosecutor’s office, and a children’s playground (Toyo- hashishi Sensaifukkoshi Hensaniinkai, 1958, pp. 365-8).

In Sendai, conflict arose among inhabitants in the area along the proposed thoroughfare from the principal railway station. There were in effect two alternative proposals for the route. One background aspect of the dispute was that, depending on the route to be adopted, some inhabitants would have to make more sacrifices than others. They were accordingly divided into two camps, each claiming that their particular route should be adopted. The City Council, in the last resort, asked the Minister of Construction to act as an arbiter. He presided over a public inquiry in May 1948 and decided to adopt one of the alternatives, thus resolving the dispute ‘at a stroke’ (Sendashikaihatsukyoku, 1980, pp. 32-45, 295-6; 1981, pp. 228-32).

Conclusion

This article has contributed to the growing literature on reconstruction by examining eight bombed cities in Japan. While the existing literature on war-damage reconstruction in Japan tends to be biased toward special cases, such as Tokyo and Hiroshima, this article has shed light on hitherto unexplored ordinary examples of reconstruction.

The examination of the eight cities shows that in general they planned drastic reconstruction, which brought about substantial changes to their physical forms, in most cases characterized by the widest street leading to a spacious square fronting the principal station of the NRC (Table 2).

Okazaki did not have such a station street with a station square since there was no nearby NRC station serving the central area of the city. There was a station of a local private railway company close to the central area. All that the city’s reconstruction plan proposed for that station was a 17 m wide station street with a station square of 2800 m² (Kensetsusho, 1957, pp. 308-9; Tokaishinbunsha, 1954, pp. 186-8).

The streets and squares connected with the NRC stations in seven out of eight cities were indicative of ‘the zeitgeist of planning and design’ in war-damage reconstruction in Japan. Though in some cases redevelopment was adaptive, the existing streets were frequently greatly widened. In Fukuyama redevelopment was substantially augmentative, though insufficient research has been undertaken to be sure how representative this is of Japanese cities more generally. While the
The reconstruction of bombed cities in Japan has been highly praised (Machida, 1960, p. 16), it has also been criticized as giving rise to standardized urban redevelopment deprived of local colour, typified by a grid pattern of streets, and in particular, by a wide street leading to a spacious square fronting the principal railway station (Ishida, 2004, p. 183; Okuda, 1960, p. 7).

The ‘voices’ of ‘actors’, especially the reactions of ordinary citizens to the official reconstruction proposals, often influenced the eventual form taken by reconstruction. In Fukuyama the opposition of citizens checked the implementation of parts of the original reconstruction plan, such as the 100 m wide road and a 50 m wide green ring. In Toyohashi the opposition among inhabitants forced the City Council to give up the proposed redevelopment of the former school site as an entertainment area: instead this area was redeveloped for civic purposes. In Hiratsuka the local protest against the plan for a land readjustment project meant that the authorities made a new plan that was more

Figure 5. Fukuyama: implementation of the revised war-damage reconstruction plan up to 1950. Streets shown in solid black are those proposed in the reconstruction plan that had so far been completed. These included part of the street running south from the station. Reproduced from Fukuyama Sensaifukkoshi Hensaniinkai (1975) p. 143, with the permission of the Town Planning Department, City of Fukuyama.
sympathetic to those occupiers of small-scale leased land.

Previous studies have argued that there was little room for local authorities in Japan to incorporate in plans the opinions of ordinary people under a town-planning system characterized by a top-down relationship between central government and local authorities. This article has demonstrated that some local authorities in fact made substantial alterations to reconstruction proposals by listening to the voices of citizens. However, this aspect of decision making was by no means an integral part of the formal planning system at that time. The success of such interventions depended on how vigorous, determined, and perhaps turbulent, the local reaction was. Extensive and well-organized opposition was usually based on the intention to protect individual interests, especially to avoid land readjustment. In fact the person responsible for the administration of land readjustment projects in Hiratsuka recalled that he worked earnestly in the face of vehement opposition, believing that the opposition movement was instigated by a section of discontented elements and that the majority of citizens were in favour of the projects (Nagamatsu, 1960, p. 43). There was still a long way to go before there materialized a genuinely democratic system of urban planning, characterized by a co-operative relationship between local authorities and
citizens, and replacing the pre-war centralized bureaucratic system. While there were prevailing ideas in planning and design that favoured substantial change in urban form, securing full support for them from a public whose prime concern was to protect individual interests understandably faced major obstacles. Thus the full implementation of the reconstruction plans of bombed cities in Japan was prevented for both economic and political reasons, as had been the case in Paris and the City of London in earlier centuries.

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Post-war reconstruction in the UK

A 1-day workshop on conserving urban landscapes reconstructed since the Second World War is being organized by Joe Nasr and Peter Larkham. This will be hosted by Birmingham City University, UK, in late June 2008 in collaboration with English Heritage and other heritage organizations. This is prompted by the number and scale of redevelopments now affecting the post-war redevelopment areas, which are now over half a century old.

It is proposed that the presentations and discussion will be taped, transcribed and developed into publishable form.

Anyone interested in contributing or attending is invited to contact the organizers by e-mail: peter.larkham@bcu.ac.uk.

Three publications on aspects of the post-war reconstruction of the UK have recently been published by the Faculty of Law, Humanities, Development and Society, Birmingham City University (formerly the University of Central England). Copies may be obtained at a cost of £5.00 each (cheques payable to Birmingham City University) from Peter Larkham, School of Property, Construction and Planning, Birmingham City University, Perry Barr, Birmingham, B42 2SU, UK.